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I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press. . . ."' The free speech clause is written in
absolute terms.2 Two centuries of federal jurisprudence, however,
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
extends this right to the states and their subdivisions. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20
(1973); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. The first amendment states that "no law" shall be made "abridging the freedom
of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. It does not, by its terms, admit to any exception to this
1
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have made clear that not all communications are constitutionally
protected from state action.3 The precise scope of the first amend-
ment has recently become an issue of great importance in the city
of Minneapolis. Since October 1983, the city has been wrestling
with various possible approaches to coping with pornography.
The city's most recent regulatory endeavor, a zoning law4 aimed at
dispersing adult theaters, adult bookstores, rap parlors,5 saunas,
and massage parlors, was struck down as unconstitutional. 6 In re-
sponse, the city considered alternative measures aimed at dealing
with pornography.
The most novel approach being considered, and that receiving
the most attention in the media 7 and in public debate, 8 is a pro-
posed ordinance in the form of an amendment to the Minneapolis
proscription. It thus lends itself to a literalist, absolutist interpretation, such as that
adopted by Supreme Court Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas. See, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 356 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). This view is not pres-
ently held by any Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
3. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); infra notes 83-91 and accom-
panying text (listing regulable types of communication). The Court in Roth noted that, in
light of the history of state guarantees of free speech at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution, "it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was
not intended to protect every utterance." Roth, 354 U.S. at 482-83.
4. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 540.410 (1977) [the Minneapolis
Code of Ordinances will hereinafter be cited as MCO].
5. Rap parlors are establishments where an unclad woman converses with a patron
with the objective of sexually arousing him.
6. Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983). See generally Case
Note, First Amendment Overrides Municipal Attempt to Zone Adult Bookstores and Theaters-Alex-
ander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983), 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
331 (1984). The Minneapolis ordinance was similar to the Detroit zoning ordinance up-
held in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Unlike the law involved in
Young, however, the Minneapolis ordinance affected existing operations, would have sub-
stantially curtailed the number of operations that could remain in business, and would
have made it virtually impossible for new operations to enter the market. See Alexander,
698 F.2d at 938.
In Alexander, the ordinance was challenged only with respect to bookstores and thea-
ters. It was not declared unconstitutional with respect to its regulation of rap parlors,
massage parlors, or saunas. Id. at 936 n.2.
A new zoning ordinance, amending MCO § 540.410(b)-(c), was signed into law by
Mayor Fraser on December 22, 1983. It requires that all adult bookstores and adult thea-
ters that go into operation after enactment of the ordinance may do business only in a
specified area in downtown Minneapolis. Id. § 540.410(c)(1). Existing theaters and book-
stores are exempted from this location requirement. Id. Massage parlors, rap parlors, and
saunas remain subject to the dispersal requirements that were voided in Alexander with
respect to bookstores and theaters. Id § 540.410(c)(2).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1984, at A 1l, col. 1; Will, Rights v. Smut in Minneapolis,
Washington Post, Jan. 8, 1984, at C7, col. 2. Both the Minneapolis Star & Tribune (Min-
neapolis's only daily newspaper) and other area news journals provided a steady diet of
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Civil Rights Code. The proposed ordinance would recognize por-
nography as a violation of women's civil rights.9 The proposed
ordinance was drafted by University of Minnesota law professor
Catharine MacKinnon and feminist author Andrea Dworkin. It
was considered and passed by the City Council in late 198310 and
news articles, editorials, and letters on the proposed ordinance throughout late 1983 and
into 1984.
8. See, e.g., Symposium." Pornography and the Constitution, HENNEPIN LAW., Mar.-Apr.
1984, at 8. This symposium presented various viewpoints on the regulation of pornogra-
phy. Since November 1983, both proponents and opponents of the civil rights approach
to pornography have regularly appeared at symposia, community meetings, and debates
throughout the Minneapolis metropolitan area to present their views.
The MacKinnon/Dworkin draft has fueled not only debate but action as well. Sev-
eral other municipalities have been considering adoption of a civil rights approach to
pornography. On April 23, 1984, the City Council of Indianapolis passed a modified ver-
sion of the MacKinnon/Dworkin draft. Indianapolis Mayor William Hudnut III signed
the bill into law on May I. The ordinance, amended on June 15, 1984, provides for
regulation of pornography under Indianapolis's Human Relations and Equal Opportu-
nity Law. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 1, American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, No. IP 84-791C (S.D. Ind. 1984) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
9. Ordinance to amend MCO Title 7, chs. 139, 141 (1982) (passed Dec. 30, 1983;
vetoed Jan. 5, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Ordinance]. The full text of the pro-
posed ordinance is reprinted in the Appendix to these Articles. See Appendizs: The MacKn-
non/Dworkin Pornography Ordinance, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 119 (1985). The possibility
of a civil rights approach to regulating pornography was first raised on October 18, 1983.
The Zoning and Planning Committee of the Minneapolis City Council met on that date
to receive community input on the zoning of adult bookstores and theaters.
Among those in attendance at the Committee meeting were Catharine MacKinnon,
Associate Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School, and Andrea Dworkin, a
feminist writer who at the time was a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota.
Dworkin and MacKinnon challenged the assumption that pornography merchants had a
right to do business anywhere in the city. They saw pornography as a violation of the civil
rights of women and argued that it should be treated as such. Heanzg of the City of Minne-
apohs Zoning Commmzssion, Oct. 18, 1983 (testimony of Andrea Dworkin). The City Council
contracted with Dworkin and MacKinnon to draft an ordinance that would effectively
regulate pornography. Dworkin and MacKinnon returned with a proposed amendment
to the Minneapolis Civil Rights Ordinance, MCO chs. 139, 141. The amendment de-
clared pornography to be a violation of the civil rights of women, and permitted a person
to bring a civil claim for injuries caused by pornography. See in/a notes 18-44 and accom-
panying text. The original draft was identical in all essential respects to the draft reintro-
duced in the City Council in 1984. This paper specifically addresses the 1983 draft
ordinance. It is this draft which is reprinted in the Appendix to these Articles. See Appen-
dix, supra.
10. The MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance was introduced in the City Coun-
cil on November 23, 1983. On December 12 and 13, the Government Operations Com-
mittee held public hearings on the proposed amendment. Minneapolis Star & Trib., Dec.
13, 1983, at IB, col. 3. The Committee reported the amendment favorably on December
22, by a vote of five to zero. The Council passed the amendment on December 30 by a
vote of seven to six. Minneapolis, Minn., City Council Official Proceedings, Dec. 30, 1983,
at 1998-99 [hereinafter cited as Official Proceedings].
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vetoed by Mayor Donald M. Fraser in January of 1984."1 Both a
second MacKinnon/Dworkin draft12 and a narrower amendment
recommended by the Minneapolis Task Force on Pornography
were introduced in the City Council in 1984.13
The innovative civil rights approach 14  of the MacKin-
11. The Mayor vetoed the amendment on January 5, 1984. Minneapolis Star &
Trib., Jan. 6, 1984, at IA, col. 1. On January 13, 1984, the Council tried to override the
veto, which required nine votes. The veto override attempt was defeated by a vote of five
to eight. Official Proceedings, Jan. 13, 1984, at 29. The failure to obtain even seven votes
in favor of the override was partially attributable to the fact that five of the 13 council
members were replaced in January 1984 as a result of recent elections.
12. A slightly altered version of the MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance was
reintroduced in the City Council on January 13, 1984, and was co-sponsored by four of
the 13 council members. Official Proceedings, Jan. 13, 1984, at 30.
13. In January, 1984, Mayor Fraser created the Minneapolis Task Force on Pornog-
raphy. Final Report, Ciy of Minneapois Task Force on Pornography, App. I [hereinafter cited as
Task Force Report]. In addition to considering the MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordi-
nance, the Task Force considered several other proposed amendments to the Minneapolis
Civil Rights Code to deal with pornography.
The Task Force was an ad hoc group which met from February through May of
1984. Task Force Report, supra, at 3. It consisted of eight people: three council members;
two members of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission (which is empowered to en-
force the city's civil rights ordinance); a member of the City Library Board; a member of
the City Arts Council; and a representative of the Mayor's office. Id The Task Force
recommended its own civil rights amendment which was considerably narrower than the
MacKinnon/Dworkin version. Minneapolis Star & Trib., May 2, 1984, at 4B, col. 5. Sev-
eral aspects of the Task Force recommendation are noted infta notes 14, 27-29.
The City Council did not vote on the 1984 MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance. In-
stead, it substituted a compromise draft containing a narrower definition of pornography.
Also, the trafficking provision was restricted to pornography that contained explicit depic-
tions of force or violence against women.
The compromise version was recommended by the Council Government Operations
Committee on June 20, 1984. The full City Council passed it on July 13 by a vote of seven
to six, but Mayor Fraser vetoed it the same day. Fraser's Veto Kills Antpom Ordinance, Min-
neapolis Star & Trib., July 14, 1984, at IA, col. 5. A seven to five vote on July 27 in favor
of the compromise version was not enough to override the veto. Council Sustains Veto of Porn
Ordinance, Minneapolis Star & Trib., July 28, 1984, at IA, col. 5.
14. The MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance and its subsequent permutations
incorporate a civil rights approach to pornography in several ways. First, they explicitly
recognize that pornography violates the civil rights of women. See in a note 21 (text of
special findings in the proposed ordinance). The amendment recommended by the Min-
neapolis Task Force on Pornography contains a similar statement recognizing pornogra-
phy as a violation of women's civil rights. Like many municipal, state, and federal civil
rights laws, these draft amendments seek to protect and promote the rights of a discrete
and identifiable subgroup of the general population.
Second, these draft amendments are regarded as civil rights measures because they
would amend the civil rights code of Minneapolis. Unlike obscenity laws, which are pres-
ently regarded as the primary legal weapon available for coping with pornography, these
amendments provide a civil rather than a criminal sanction. Compare MCO § 385.130
(criminal obscenity law) with MCO § 139.10-.50, 141.10-. 100 (civil rights and remedies for
discrimination). Moreover, the enforcement mechanism for remedying discrimination
[Vol. I11
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non/Dworkin draft raises novel constitutional questions. The defi-
nition of pornography contained in the proposed ordinance' 5 is
broader than the constitutional definition of obscenity. 16 When
the definition is read in conjunction with a provision forbidding
trafficking in pornography, 7 the net effect is that one may incur
civil liability for selling or distributing material that has previously
been assumed to be constitutionally protected. The proposed ordi-
nance is therefore susceptible to a constitutional challenge on the
ground that it violates the free speech provision of the first
amendment.
This Article addresses the constitutionality of the MacKin-
non/Dworkin proposed ordinance and argues for the legality of
the civil rights approach. The Article does not propose that the
courts expand or modify the well-established obscenity exception
to the first amendment. Instead, it proposes that the courts carve
out a new exception to protected speech, an exception based on
the concept of pornography as a violation of women's civil rights.
The Article first discusses the content of the proposed ordinance,
focusing on its definition of pornography and its operative provi-
sions. The Article then discusses the proposed ordinance in light of
current first amendment doctrine. It sets forth the proper frame-
work within which the constitutionality of the proposed ordinance
should be analyzed. The Article then compares the proposed civil
rights exception with the recognized exceptions to first amend-
ment protection and discusses whether the courts are likely to rec-
ognize it as an exception unto itself.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE
The MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance would amend
the Minneapolis Civil Rights Code' 8 to redefine discrimination to
through pornography would be the same as for remedying other forms of discrimination
proscribed in the civil rights code.
For a discussion of enforcement mechanisms provided in the Minneapolis Civil
Rights Code, see infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. Additional differences between
obscenity law and the civil rights approach are discussed infa at notes 95-105, 191-94 and
accompanying text.
15. The text of the pornography definition is discussed infra notes 24-30 and accompa-
nying text.
16. For a discussion of the difference between obscenity as defined by the Supreme
Court and pornography as defined in the proposed ordinance, see in/fa notes 92-105 and
accompanying text.
17. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(1).
18. MCO chs. 139, 141.
19851
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include pornography 9 and prohibit that discrimination in certain
contexts.20 The proposed ordinance includes findings of fact
which identify the harms caused by pornography.2 ' For purposes
of free speech analysis, the most important provisions of the ordi-
nance are its definition of pornography2 2 and its operative
provisions.
2 3
The proposed ordinance defines pornography as "the sexually
explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted, whether in
pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the follow-
ing"24 depictions:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects,
things or commodities; or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or
humiliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience
sexual pleasure in being raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up
or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission or
sexual servility, including by inviting penetration; or
(vi) women's body parts-including but not limited to
vaginas, breasts, and buttocks-are exhibited, such that
women are reduced to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or ani-
mals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury,
19. Proposed Ordinance § 1, to amend MCO §§ 139.10(a), (b).
20. Id § 4, to add MCO §§ 139.40(/)-(o).
21. Id. § 1, to add MCO § 139.10(a)(1). This provision states:
SPECIAL FINDINGS ON PORNOGRAPHY The Council finds that pornogra-
phy is central in creating and maintaining the civil inequality of the sexes. Por-
nography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex
which differentially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it promotes, with
the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for equality of rights
in employment, education, property rights, public accommodations and public
services; create public harassment and private denigration; promote injury and
degradation such as rape, battery and prostitution and inhibit just enforcement
of laws against these acts; contribute significantly to restricting women from full
exercise of citizenship and participation in public life, including in neighbor-
hoods; damage relations between the sexes; and undermine women's equal exer-
cise of rights to speech and action guaranteed to all citizens under the
constitutions and laws of the United States and the State of Minnesota.
Id
22. Id § 3, to add MCO § 139 .20(gg).
23. Id § 4, to add MCO §§ 139.40(/)-(o).
24. Id § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
[Vol. I I
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torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or
hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
25
The definition of pornography thus consists of four elements.
Material does not constitute pornography unless it (a) is sexually
explicit; (b) is a graphic depicition; (c) subordinates women; and
(d) includes one of the nine particular depictions of women set
forth in the ordinance.26 Though pornography is defined in terms
of women, material also constitutes pornography if men, children,
or transsexuals are used in place of women. 27 The ordinance does
25. Id. § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(l)(i)-(ix). The ordinance does not contain a
scienter requirement. Instead, the ordinance provides that it is not a defense to liability
"that the defendant did not know or intend that the materials were pornography or sex
discrimination." Id. § 4, to add MCO § 13 9 .4 0(p).
The obscenity doctrine contains a constitutional scienter requirement. One cannot
be liable for trafficking in obscene materials unless he knew the nature or the contents of
the material. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 152-55 (1959). Given the Court's strong aversion to the imposition of strict
liability for communications, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (scienter
requirement for trafficking in child pornography); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974) (negligence requirement for defamation), it would probably require scien-
ter for pornography regulation. If so, a court could simply read the scienter requirement
into the ordinance. The scienter requirement need not appear within the four corners of
the statute. Many obscenity statutes do not explicitly set forth a scienter requirement. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982) (federal obscenity trafficking statute).
The "know or intend" provision contained in the ordinance is consistent with the
constitutional scienter requirement set forth in Hamhg and Smith. Smith requires that the
defendant know what the material contains. 361 U.S. at 153. The Court does not require
that he know or intend that it is obscene. Hamhg, 418 U.S. at 123.
26. The ordinance does not expressly require that the material be "taken as a whole."
This is a constitutional requirement under the obscenity doctrine. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-92 (1957). The purpose
of this rule is to avoid the chilling effect that a line-by-line determination of obscenity
would otherwise produce. In light of this purpose, the "taken as a whole" rule would
presumably be required of a pornography regulation.
There appeared to be an understanding among supporters of the ordinance and
members of the City Council that this requirement was implicit in the draft ordinance.
The requirement was expressly written into the draft ordinance prior to its full considera-
tion by the City Council in 1984, when the Government Operations Committee amended
section three of the draft ordinance to read: "This [trafficking] section shall not be con-
strued to make isolated passage(s) or isolated part(s) actionable."
27. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(2). During the debate on the
MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance, concern was expressed about defining pornog-
raphy in terms of women. Indeed, the draft recommended by the Task Force defined
pornography in a manner similar to the MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance, but
everywhere substituted "person" for "women." See Task Force Report, supra note 13, App.
V, at 1. The Task Force apparently did so out of fear that a gender-specific definition
might be unconstitutional.
The definition contained in the revised draft is not gender-specific. The use of men,
transsexuals, and children in the specified depictions in place of women also constitutes
pornography. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 13 9. 2 0(gg)(2). Pornography is
1985]
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not define the terms "sexually explicit,' 28 "subordination, ' 29 or
"graphically depicted. '30
The material encompassed in the definition may be the subject
of a civil complaint when it is involved in the factual contexts set
forth in the ordinance's four operative provisions. The first of
these provisions prohibits coercing a person into taking part in the
production of pornography. 31 For instance, a woman could not be
forced to be in a pornographic film. Liability extends to the coerc-
ing party, as well as to the seller, distributor, and exhibitor of the
material. 32 The second operative provision prohibits the produc-
tion, sale, exhibition, or distribution of pornography. 33 This traf-
ficking provision exempts public libraries, and public and private
pornography regardless of the gender of the individual protrayed. The drafters made
specific mention of transsexuals to avoid any possible difficulties a court may have in
deciding the status of transsexuals as men or women.
28. The version recommended by the Task Force includes a definition of "sexually
explicit" as:
(1) Actual or simulated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-geni-
tal, anal-genital or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex or between a person and animals; or
(2) Uncovered exhibition of the breasts, genitals, pubic region, buttocks or
anus of any person.
Task Force Report, supra note 13, App. II, at 2.
Note that this definition excludes some material that is generally understood as por-
nography, particularly material that is often regarded as especially hard-core or deviant.
For instance, it will exclude depictions of bondage where the victim's breasts, crotch, and
buttocks are covered by the binding material. It will exclude sadomasochistic depictions
that display bruises and lash marks on the victim's thighs and back. It will also exclude
depictions of urination or defecation on the victim's body or into the victim's mouth,
where the victim is fully clothed.
29. The version recommended by the Task Force defines subordination as "the treat-
ment of another as inferior; submissive to, or controlled by another; made subject or sub-
servient to another." Task Force Report, supra note 13, App. II, at 2.
There is a small but highly significant element of ambiguity in this definition. The
ambiguity concerns the meaning of the term "another." If that someone must appear in
the picture, then this definition would drastically narrow the scope of the definition. A
depiction of a single person could never be pornography, since a second person would not
be present. Even if a second person were present, there would be no subordination if the
model were being submissive to or controlled by another person who was not in the
picture.
30. For a comparison of this definition of pornography with the constitutional defini-
tion of obscenity, see infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text. Note that offensiveness is
not one of the elements of the definition. During the course of debate on the draft, it has
occasionally been misconstrued as permitting a claim by any woman who finds material
offensive. Neither the definition of pornography nor its underlying policy rationale have
anything to do with offensiveness. Whether or not material is offensive, it constitutes por-
nography only if it meets the four requirements set forth in the definition.
31. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(m).
32. Id
33. Id, to add MCO § 139.40(1). The most notable difference between the MacKin-
[Vol. I11
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university and college libraries, from its scope. 34 The third provi-
sion provides a cause of action for a person who has pornography
forced upon her in a place of employment, education, public ac-
commodation, or at home.35 Liability here is limited to the person
who forced the material upon the complainant and to the institu-
tion where it occurred.
36
The final operative provision provides damages for someone
who is "assaulted, physically attacked or injured in a way that is
directly caused by specific pornography. '37 A victim may bring a
complaint against the perpetrator or against the maker, distribu-
tor, seller, or exhibitor of the pornography. 38 On finding that an
assault was caused by a specific piece of pornography, a court may
enjoin the further exhibition, distribution, or sale of the
pornography.
3 9
non/Dworkin proposal and the draft recommended by the Task Force is the latter's lack
of a trafficking provision.
34. Id., to add MCO § 139.40(/)(1).
The library exclusion is constitutionally suspect. In City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283
N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979), the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated a city obscenity
ordinance provision that exempted schools, churches, medical clinics, physicians, govern-
mental agencies and others. The material involved was not otherwise entitled to constitu-
tional protection and the city clearly intended to regulate it. The court therefore severed
and invalidated the exemption rather than invalidating the ordinance as a whole. Id at
537.
The library exemption contained in the ordinance is distinguishable from the Duluth
provision at issue in Sarelte. Whereas the Duluth exemption gave special treatment to
certain people by exempting those people and institutions to which they have access, the
proposed ordinance exemption does not draw so sharp a line. Public libraries and public
university libraries are open to all. A finding of unconstitutionality would likely be due to
the inclusion of private university libraries within the exemption. If the exemption is
declared unconstitutional and the court determines that pornography is regulable, the
court could sever and void the exemption for the reasons stated in Sarelte.
35. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(n).
36. Id
37. d., to add MCO § 139.40(o).
38. Id. It is important to underscore the point that, as with the other operative provi-
sions, the assault provision is dependent on the pornography definition. Both pornogra-
phy and the assault due to pornography must be present. See id. If an assault is triggered
by sexually explicit material, assault does not make that material pornography. See gener-
ally Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1981), cerl. dented, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982). In Ov4a N., a rape with a bottle was patterned
after a prime-time television show. Unless the television show were held to be pornogra-
phy within the ordinance's definition, the rape in Oliviag N. would not be actionable under
the proposed ordinance.
In this respect, the pornography definition is more objective than obscenity law.
Under the obscenity doctrine, the determination of whether material is obscene can turn
on who is viewing the material. See tnfa notes 95-105.
39. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(o). Pornography complaints
would follow procedures similar to other civil rights complaints under MCO chapter 141.
19851
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All complaints of discrimination by pornography are to be
made to the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission, 4° which is
charged with investigating and adjudicating all complaints of dis-
crimination. 4' The Commission itself has no enforcement pow-
ers.42 Its decisions are enforceable by court order.43 Decisions of
the Commission are reviewable by the district courts upon appli-
cation by either party."
III. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
As a content-based regulation, the proposed ordinance raises se-
rious constitutional questions. The ordinance has been challenged
as violative of the first amendment. 45 Opponents of the ordinance
argue that it is vague, overbroad, and a regulation of protected
speech.
A constitutional analysis of the proposed ordinance requires
more than a comparison of the scope of the proposed ordinance
with the scope of the recognized exceptions to the first amend-
ment. It is not enough, for instance, to assert that the amendment
is unconstitutional because its definition of pornography is broader
than the constitutional definition of obscenity. 46 The ordinance
must be measured against both the general dimensions of the free
speech provision and the rules of law and doctrines that it has
spawned.
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has carved out
certain exceptions to protected speech.47 The Supreme Court has
40. MCO § 141.50. It is the author's view that very few complaints brought under
the assault provision are likely to be successful. A claimant must show both that the assail-
ant consumed pornography and that that particular piece of pornography triggered the
assault. Unless the pornography is present during the assault and the assailant is viewing
the material in the course of his actions, one or both of these elements will be very difficult
to prove.
41. Id § 141.40(6)-(7).
42. Id. § 141.60(c).
43. Id
44. Id § 141.60(b).
45. See Head of State MCLUasks Fraser to veto pornography law, Minneapolis Star & Trib.,
Jan. 2, 1984, at IB, col. 1.
46. The current constitutional definition of obscenity was announced in Miller v. Cal-
ifornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller definition is set forth infra at note 94 and accompa-
nying text.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I. States may limit the time, place, and manner of speech.
Eg., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). The power to regulate speech by time,
place, and manner restrictions is not pertinent to the scope of this Article. See generally J.
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denied constitutional protection to a form of communication
whenever, in the view of the Court, the harm caused by the com-
munication greatly outweighs its social value.48  This requires the
Court to balance the state interest sought to be protected with the
harm of the communication. 49 Utilizing this approach, the Court
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 973-88 (2d ed. 1983) [herein-
after cited as NOWAK].
The government may freely regulate certain sorts of behavior, though the behavior
has a communicative dimension. Even Justice William Douglas, a noted first amendment
absolutist, conceded this point:
Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be that was aimed at
destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy. I would be
willing to concede that such conduct directed at a race or group in this country
could be made an indictable offense. For such a project would be more than the
exercise of free speech. Like picketing, it would be free speech plus.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 284 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (overturning breach of the
peace conviction for wearing a jacket bearing the words "fuck the draft"); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (setting forth constitutional standard for regulation of
expressive conduct).
48. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), rev'd, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
49. In Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, the Court upheld a law banning the use of children in the
production of pornography. The Court balanced the state's compelling interest "in safe-
guarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor," id. at 756-57 (citation
omitted), against the de minimus value of permitting sexual performances by minors, id
at 762. The Court concluded that in the case of child pornography "it may be appropri-
ately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be re-
stricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests . . . at stake" that the entire
class of communication is regulable and "no process of case-by-case adjudication is re-
quired." Id. at 763-64.
In Pfftsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. 376, the Court upheld a ban on a newspaper's listing
employment opportunities under headings designating preference by sex. The Court rec-
ognized the legitimate state interest in forbidding practices that foster sex discrimination
in employment. Id. at 383-89. On the other hand, the restriction was not made for the
"purpose of muzzling or curbing the press" and did not impair the paper's "financial
viability" or "its ability to publish and distribute its newspapers." Id at 383. On balance,
the state interest in the regulation outweighed the first amendment interests involved. 413
U.S. at 389.
In Roth, 354 U.S. 476, the Court held that obscene materials may be regulated. The
regulation at issue furthered a state interest in order and morality by regulating material
that was "utterly without redeeming social importance." Id. at 484-85.
In Chapinsky, 315 U.S. 568, the Court held that states may proscribe the utterance of
fighting words. Such terms are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas .... " Id. at
572. Fighting words are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity." Id
This approach does not require a case-by-case determination of the scope of the first
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has ruled that false defamatory statements,50 fighting words, 51
words creating a clear and present danger, 52 obscenity, 53 and child
pornography54 are not protected speech.
This methodology of first amendment jurisprudence has impor-
tant ramifications. First, the balancing approach reveals the essen-
tial nature of the first amendment. The free speech provision has
spawned innumerable rules of law, but it is not itself a rule of law.
It is a statement of policy. 55 As interpreted by the Court, a com-
munication is constitutionally protected unless it would unduly
frustrate a countervailing compelling state interest.
Second, determining whether a certain type of communication
falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the definition of
speech is the beginning, not the end, of free speech analysis. Even
if a communication does not fit within a recognized exception it
may be undeserving of constitutional protection if the harm of the
speech sufficiently outweighs its value.56
A law will also be held invalid if it is unduly vague or overbroad
regardless of whether it addresses a harm that is sufficient to justify
regulation of communication. Merely furthering an important
state interest is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the free
speech provision. Legislation must be precisely drafted to limit its
amendment. The test balances the harms and value of entire classes of communication,
not individual communications. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
50. Beauharnazs, 343 U.S. at 256. The precise issue in Beauharnazs was the constitution-
ality of a state statute regulating group libel. The Court upheld the statute. Id. at 266.
Subsequent decisions of the Court have cast doubt on the continued validity of the Beau-
harnais holding. See injra note 120 and accompanying text. The broad supposition under-
lying Beauhamazir, that false defamatory speech is not protected, remains true. See, e.g.,
Hutchinson v. Proximire, 443 U.S. 111,133-36 (1979) (defamation claim reinstated where
petitioner was held to be a private figure rather than a public figure).
51. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
52. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
53. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
54. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-64.
55. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the
public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which com-
pose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves... [W]e
must never forget that it is a constlution we are expounding.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
56. See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760-61 (holding that child pornography is not constitu-
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reach to only the harm that it purports to address.57
In light of these considerations, assessing the constitutionality of
the proposed civil rights ordinance requires a three-step process.
First, one should consider whether the material sought to be regu-
lated falls within a recognized exception to the first amendment.
If it does not, then it is necessary to assess whether the Court is
likely to find that the harm of the communication sought to be
regulated greatly outweighs its value. This second stage of the
analysis is more complicated, requiring consideration of the harm,
whether the same or similar harm has been recognized as constitu-
tionally significant in other contexts, and an assessment of the so-
cial value of the material. Finally, the proposed ordinance must
be evaluated for possible vagueness or overbreadth.
Much of the material to be regulated by the proposed ordinance
does not fall within the scope of any of the recognized exceptions. 58
Nonetheless, it is possible that the Supreme Court, after balancing
the state interest involved against the value of the communications
involved, would hold that the communications covered by the or-
dinance may be regulated. It is also possible that the Court would
find that the ordinance is neither vague nor overbroad, and is
therefore constitutional.
IV. THE STATE INTEREST IN REGULATING PORNOGRAPHY
The political basis for the proposed ordinance is the harm that
pornography causes to women. 59 The legal basis for denying such
material constitutional protection is the state interest in combating
that harm.6°
57. Set infra notes 148-93 and accompanying text.
58. Some, but not all, of the material sought to be regulated by the proposed ordi-
nance can already be regulated under the recognized obscenity exception to first amend-
ment protection. Pornography and obscenity are entirely distinct concepts, however. See
infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text (pornography distinguished from obscenity).
59. The civil rights approach to pornography embodied in the proposed ordinance is
the first regulation of pornography that focuses on the harm to women. Previous ap-
proaches to pornography have sought to alleviate other perceived harms. Obscenity laws
further "the social interest in order and morality." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). Zoning
laws, which regulate the sale or exhibition of pornography, protect property values and
neighborhiod stability. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 54-
55 (1976). Laws restricting pornographic material to "adults only" areas are often in-
tended to protect minors. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 617.291, subd. 2 (1982) (legislative pur-
pose of statute regulating sale of pornography was to protect the "health, welfare and
safety of. . . minors within the state").
60. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the harm of pornography outside of the
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free speech context. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-61 (1973), the
Court discussed the harm caused by pornography in the course of limiting the constitu-
tional right to privacy.
The constitutional right to privacy protects personal rights that are regarded as fun-
damental, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The precise textual basis has
been a source of mild disagreement on the Court. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Douglas, J., plurality) (right to privacy is a penumbra of the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments), with id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(right to privacy is implicit in the ninth amendment) and id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment). The source of the right to privacy is now generally re-
garded as emanating from the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The
right protects personal privacy in actions and decisions regarding family and marriage.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute requiring court approval of marriage
of individual with children obligated to support held unconstitutional); Roe, 410 U.S. 113
(right to abortion); Carey, 431 U.S. at 678 (right of unmarried people to purchase and use
contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute barring interracial marriage
held unconstitutional); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (right of married people to purchase and
use contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (voiding sterilization re-
quirement for repeat criminal offenders); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(right to educate child at private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to
teach child a foreign language). The right to privacy also protects the right to read ob-
scenity in one's own home. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
In Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court dealt with obscene films that constituted hard-core
pornography and would likely fall within the ordinance's definition of pornography. See
413 U.S. at 52. The State of Georgia urged that the material be denied constitutional
protection, arguing that it had a "tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact
leading to antisocial behavior." Id. at 63. The Court acknowledged that this concern was
both legitimate and important, saying:
The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an ample
basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human exist-
ence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of
Sex.
Id. at 63. The Court thus recognized that the state could regulate communication that
had a substantial, harmful effect on the way people relate to each other. The Court ruled
that material may be declared obscene and regulated even though it was being displayed
to consenting adults in a movie theatre. In so ruling, the Court held that people had no
constitutional right to publicly view any material they desired. Id at 65-67; see also United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (Congress may prohibit shipment of obscene material
by public or private carrier); United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413
U.S. 123 (1973) (Congress may bar the importation of obscene materials intended solely
for personal use); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1970) (Congress may ban use of
mails for sending obscene materials to consenting adults); cf. Stanley, 394 U.S. 557 (one has
a constitutional right to read obscene material in his own home).
In the case of pornography, the asserted harm is more clearly identified and is sup-
ported by a voluminous record of personal testimony and scientific data. See lnfa notes 75-
77 and accompanying text. This solid empirical and theoretical basis may support the
constitutionality of a broader regulation.
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The harm of pornography is multi-faceted. 61 First, pornogra-
phy alters and distorts people's notions of sexuality. It alters our
notions of consent and nonconsent to sexual activity. Pornogra-
phy describes and defines sexuality.6 2 The theme is sexual arousal,
whether or not the material actually depicts sexual activity be-
tween individuals. Pornography aims to arouse its audience, typi-
cally males, through depictions of dominance and violence.
63 It
makes dominance over women and violence against women sexy
and sexually fulfilling. It injects and integrates notions of domina-
tion and violence into the sphere of sexual activity.
Pornography usually depicts women enjoying their victimiza-
tion. 64 Pornographic photography or drawings will often accom-
pany articles stating that women enjoy being treated in a
particular manner. 65  Some materials also serve as "how-to"
guides. For example, there are bondage magazines that describe
how to make escape-proof knots.66
61. The discussion of pornography that follows is not expected to convince anyone of
the seriousness of the pornography problem. The author intends only to set forth the
general contours of the harm of pornography.
One cannot honestly or fairly consider the constitutional questions involved without
an understanding of the material at issue. A full appreciation of pornography cannot be
obtained without first-hand examination of the material. Readers are encouraged to ex-
amine pornography. Women, who generally have less contact with pornography in their
daily lives than do men, are especially encouraged to examine this material.
The titles of pornographic material cited in this Article are intended to give the
reader a sense of this material. They are actual publications available in the Minneapolis
area. Many of the publications are on file with the Pornography Resource Center, Minne-
apolis, Minnesota. Others were gathered in a recent informal survey of the shelves of one
of Minneapolis's most popular adult bookstores.
62. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.2 0 (gg)(1) (definition of pornogra-
phy). Pornography is the subordination of women through sexuality. Pornography cre-
ates a construct of sexuality and subordinates women through that construct. For more
about the message of pornography and the dimensions of its social impact, see A. DWOR-
KIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WO-
MEN ON PORNOGRAPHY (L. Lederer ed. 1981).
63. See, e.g., Diroy Pool, HUSTLER, Jan. 1983 (gang rape on pool table); Belle ofthe Ball,
HUSTLER, May, 1978, at 82 (interracial gang rape by men in chains); The Second Sktn,
PENTHOUSE, Sept. 1980, at 130, 181 ("Bowing to his stronger will, we could not help but
defer .... ").
64. See ANAL BONUS 1 (undated); ANYTHING GOES 1 (undated); BoY ON GIRL I
(1981); Hayloft Harvest, HUSTLER, May, 1979, at 40; WILD FUCKING 1 (undated); Cheating
Bitch, RED CHEEKS, Mar. 1979, at I (estranged husband returns home and beats wife).
65. See supra note 63.
66. See Minneapolis City Council Government Operations Committee Public Hearings on Ordi-
nances to Add Pornography As Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 12-13, 1983 [hereinafter cited
as Hearings] Session II, at 68. At the Minneapolis public hearings on the proposed ordi-
nance, women testified about men acting out specific pieces of pornography. See Hear-
ings, supra, Session II, at 63-64 (testimony of a private citizen) (husband persuaded wife to
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One pervasive notion in pornography is that women are willing
to submit to men's every sexual whim. Pornography assumes the
consent of all women before any woman has been given the oppor-
tunity to grant her consent. As a seven billion dollar industry, the
pornography industry is our society's largest source of information
on sexual behavior.67 Pornographers are the nearest thing to
America's sex educators. The message they convey generally goes
unchallenged. During the hearings on the ordinance in December
1983, numerous women described how they were sexually coerced
and abused by men who "learned" from pornography. 68 Ther-
apists and counselors who had worked with sex offenders described
case histories in which the offender believed, because of pornogra-
phy, that there was nothing wrong with what he was doing.69 Por-
enact scenarios from pornographic magazines), Session III, at 23-24 (testimony of Wanda
Richardson, Harriet Tubman Women's Shelter staff member) (two women shown X-rated
movies and then forced to act out scenes at home; woman later hospitalized); Session III,
at 29 (testimony of Donna Dunn, Women's Shelter, Inc., staff member) (woman forcibly
stripped, bound, and gagged by husband, then raped by a German Shepard). Prostitutes
are often encouraged to act out pornography by "johns" who will hand the prostitute an
article or picture and tell her to perform it on him. Id, Session II, at 721 (testimony of a
former prostitute), Session III, at 76 (testimony of Sue Santa, Minneapolis Youth Division
staff member). In addition, pimps sometimes use pornography as training manuals, show-
ing it to their prostitutes to teach them how to perform various sexual acts. Id, Session III,
at 76 (testimony of Sue Santa) ("its like a mail order catalogue of sex acts, and that is what
[the prostitute] is expected to perform").
67. M. Langelan, The PoilicalEconomy of Pornography, AEGIS, Autumn 1981, at 5. This
figure was listed as a conservative estimate, with total U.S. sales probably closer to $10-15
billion in 1981. The industry has grown rapidly during the past thirty years. SeeM. at 7-9.
In light of this steady growth, combined with inflation over the past three years, the por-
nography industry may now have annual gross sales equal to or exceeding $20 billion.
The pornography industry is as large or larger than the film and record industries
combined. Cook, The X-RatedEconomy, FORBES, Sept. 18, 1978, at 81. In 1981, Americans
spent $2.75 billion at motion picture theaters, INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ALMA-
NAC 28A (R. Gertner ed. 1984), and consumed $4.246 billion worth of phonograph records
and tapes, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 237
(1984). In 1980, pornographic video cassettes outsold other video cassettes by three to one.
Langelan, supra, at 8.
68. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 66, Session II, at 63-64 (testimony of a private citi-
zen). In the many incidents discussed at the hearings, however, it was far more common
for men to act out pornography on women without regard to whether they believed the
women enjoyed it. See, e.g., id. Session III, at 47-48 (testimony of Cheryl Champion, Wash-
ington County Human Services, Inc., Sexual Abuse Unit) (two teenagers kidnapped and
forced to act out pornography), Session II, at 74 (testimony of a former prostitute); see also
supra note 66.
69. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 66, Session III, at 63-64 (testimony of Nancy Steele)
(pornography used to justify molestation of a client's daughter); Session III, at 68 (testi-
mony of Richelle Lee, State of Minnesota Department of Corrections) (pornography used
to justify incest). Pornography's message as to acceptable sexual behavior influences the
perpetrator as well as the victim. When men act out pornography, the pornography legiti-
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nography creates and legitimizes the pornography consumer's
notions of sexuality.
A second harm of pornography is the injury suffered by those
involved in its production. The production of films, videos, and
photographs requires the use of real people. Real women must
pose and act out the roles that pornography creates.70 Real wo-
men must be bound, bruised, cut, and in the case of "snuff" films,
killed to produce pornography. 71 Although it is argued that many
women voluntarily take part in the production of pornography,
72
many do not. 73 Some women are coerced or physically forced into
making pornography.
74
A third harm of pornography is that it alters men's attitudes
and behavior toward women. Pornography affects the way men
mizes their actions. It helps men to believe-or at least convince themselves-that what
they are doing is right. Id. Pornography is also used to convince victims that it is socially
proper to submit to acts they would otherwise resist. See id., Session II, at 70-71 (testimony
of a former prostitute); Session III, at 71 (testimony of Charlotte Kasl, therapist); Session
III, at 79 (testimony of Sue Santa, Minneapolis Youth Division, Inc.).
70. See A. DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 201-02.
71. See Two accused of murder zn snufffilm, Oakland Trib., Aug. 6, 1983, at A-6, col. 1
(report of two teenage girls slain in the production of a pornographic film).
72. People may differ as to the degree to which they believe a woman may actually
choose to participate in the making of pornography. There are those who believe that
women are as free to exercise individual choices as men. There are others, however, who
question the degree of freedom afforded to women and other oppressed groups in our
society. The subordinate status of women, discussed infra note 81 and accompanying text,
may circumscribe the free will of individual women, particularly with respect to choices
involving the availability of their bodies. If so, traditional notions of free will are inappli-
cable to women.
73. Numerous witnesses at the ordinance hearings attested to forced participation.
The testimony of Linda Marchiano, Hearings, supra note 66, Session I, at 45-57, formerly
known as "Linda Lovelace," describes a brutal captivity that is not unique among women
in the pornography industry. See L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1980). The results of a lie de-
tector test taken by Ms. Marchiano regarding her imprisonment and physical abuse were
also introduced into evidence at the hearings. Hearings, supra note 66, Session I, at 57.
Another woman at the hearings described how a male friend coerced her into acting
in pornographic material. Though the incident occurred several years ago, she was still
scarred by it. Id, Session II, at 58-61 (testimony of a private citizen). A prostitute de-
scribed how women new to the profession were pressured by their pimps into participating
in pornography. The pornography was then used to blackmail them into continuing in
prostitution. Id., Session I, at 58-59 (letter from Dr. Kathleen Barry, author of FEMALE
SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979)).
74. See, e.g., L. LOVELACE, supra note 73; Hearings, supra note 66, Session III, at 77
(testimony of Sue Santa, Minneapolis Youth Division); Session II, at 81 (testimony of a
former prostitute); Hearings, supra note 66, Session II, at 58-61 (testimony of a private
citizen). It is unclear what proportion of women are emotionally coerced or physically
forced into the making of pornography. The number of women who have detailed their
own involuntary participation indicates that the number may be substantial.
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think about women. 75 For example, men who view pornography
develop more callous attitudes toward women. 76 Pornography
also affects the way men act towards women. Pornography in-
creases aggression toward women.17  It makes men more likely to
75. Malamuth, Rape Fantasies as a Function of Exposure to Violent-Sexual Stimuli, 10
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 33 (1981); Malamuth & Check, The Eects of Mass Media
Exposure on Acceptance of Violence against Women. AField Experiment, 15J. RESEARCH IN PER-
SONALITY 436 (1981).
76. Zillmann & Bryant, Pornography, Sexual Callousness, and the Trivialization of Rape, 32
J. COM. 10 (1982). Men who have viewed pornography are more likely to believe myths
about rape (e.g. women enjoy rape). Malamuth & Check, supra note 75, at 436. Men who
have viewed pornography are also less likely to empathize with a woman victimized by a
sexual crime. Malamuth & Check, Penile Tumescence and Perceptual Responses to Rape as a
Function of the Victim's Perceived Reactions, 10 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 528 (1980).
77. Donnerstein & Berkowitz, Victim Reactions in Aggressive Erotic Films as a Factor in
Violence Against Women, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 710 (1981); Donnerstein
& Hallam, The Facilitating Effects of Erotica on Aggression Against Women, 36 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1270 (1978); Meyer, The Effects of Sexually Arousing and Violent Films on
Aggressive Behavior, 8 J. SEX RESEARCH 324, 329 (1972).
In the Donnerstein & Berkowitz study, supra, males were provided with an opportu-
nity to aggress against a female after viewing a rape scene where the victim reacted either
positively or negatively to her victimization. The study found that the negative ending led
to aggression against the woman only if the male was previously angered. The positive
ending triggered aggression against the women no matter what the male's mental state.
One of the authors to the study noted that pornography typically shows the woman en-
joying her victimization. Donnerstein & Malamuth, Pornography. Its Consequences On The
Observer, in SEXUAL DYNAMICS OF ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 31, 38 (L. Schlesinger & E.
Revitch eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Consequences]; accord Smith, The Social Content of
Pornography, 26 J. CoM. 16, 22 (1976). The results involving the positive ending are thus
more pertinent to an examination of the effects of pornography.
In Consequences, supra, Professors Malamuth and Donnerstein collected studies showing
that pornography lacking explicit violence led to both increases and decreases in male
aggression. They reconcile these apparent conflicts by theorizing that nonviolent pornog-
raphy will increase aggression in previously angered males, while nonviolent pornography
triggering only "a low level of arousal" may decrease aggression by males not previously
disposed to aggress. Id. at 33-35. If this is the case, then pornography will not promote
physical harm to women provided that it does not possess explicitly violent content and is
not consumed by males predisposed to aggress against females.
Pornography has become increasingly violent during the past thirty years. Lundberg,
On Pornography, Censorship and the Subordination of Women, HENNEPIN LAW. Mar.-Apr. 1984,
at 22 & n. 1. According to one study, even Playboy and Penthouse, the American standard
bearers of so-called soft-core porn, have become increasingly violent. Malamuth & Spin-
ner, A Longitudinal Content Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Best-Selling Erotic Magazines, 16 J.
SEX RESEARCH 226 (1980).
Malamuth and Donnerstein's statement that pornography may in some cases reduce
aggression does not negate the harm of nonviolent pornography. Aggression against wo-
men is only one aspect of this harm. Nonviolent pornography also shapes male attitudes
toward women. E.g., Zillmann & Bryant, supra note 76, at 10; Malamuth, Haber &
Feshbach, Testing Hypotheses Regarding Rape: Exposure to Sexual Violence, Sex Difterences, and the
"Normality" of Rapists, 14 J. RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 121 (1980). In addition to the
studies cited here, studies are collected in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION (N.
[Vol. I I
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commit violent acts against women.78
This third harm of pornography is different than the first harm
discussed: 79 in addition to distorting notions of sexuality, pornog-
raphy also alters men's attitudes and behavior toward women
outside the sphere of sexual activity. It affects the way women are
treated in all circumstances, under all conditions.80 This harm of
pornography is thus broader in scope than the first harm.
These three harms of pornography are exacerbated by the social
condition of women. The existence of pornography does not
merely inject an element of unfairness into an otherwise fair soci-
ety. Rather, it tramples on the rights of a discrete class of people
who already occupy a subordinate social status.81 Pornography fu-
els this inequality. It fuels discrimination and violence against wo-
Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984), and Baldwin, Pornography. Not Just a Fantasy, HEN-
NEPIN LAW. Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 9.
Research in this area has been conspicuously lacking in conflicting results. Hearings,
supra note 66, Session I, at 44 (testimony of Dr. Edward Donnerstein). One oft-cited ex-
ception is the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY AND OBSCENITY (1970).
The Commission's conclusion that pornography does not cause violence, REPORT, supra, at
139, has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Malamuth & Donnerstein, The Effects of Aggressive-
Pornographic Mass Media Stimult, 15 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 103
(1982). The Supreme Court has relied on the Commission's minority report indicating a
connection between pornography and criminal behavior. See Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1973).
As with all social science research, application of laboratory findings to the outside
world may be suspect. It is thus noteworthy that as laboratory conditions are made in-
creasingly complex to simulate real life conditions, the harmful effects become clearer.
Donnerstein, Pornography.- Its Eftt on Violence Agatist Women, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX-
UAL AGRESSION (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984).
78. See supra note 77.
79. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
80. Inherent in the definition of pornography as the subordination of women through
sexuality is the understanding that pornography depicts women only as sexual beings.
Pornography eroticizes women in all their roles. Whether the woman is depicted in the
workplace, at a social gathering, at home, or alone in a room, her essence is sexuality.
Playboy, for example, is well-known for its thematic pictorials of women in college, in vari-
ous occupations, and in the armed forces. See, e.g., Beauty and Bureaucracy, PLAYBOY, Nov.
1980, at 126 (female government employees in Washington, D.C.); Girls of the Southwest
Conference, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1980, at 140 (female university students); The Girls of the Offce,
PLAYBOY, Aug. 1978, at 138 (secretarial workers); see also D. SCOTT, BLOW HARD BABY-
SITTER (1984); MILK MAID PARADE (1984) (lactating women); SWANK 6 (1984) (heralding
the arrival of Toilet Tarts, a pornographic magazine that apparently focuses on women
inserting and removing tampons).
Pornography also defines female sexuality in terms of particular body parts.
Magazines such as Big Boobs, Bottom, Busty Shavers, Foot World, Juggs, Pantied Bottoms, and
Shaved need no explanation; see also Moons in June, PLAYBOY, June 1980, at 177.
81. Women are treated unfairly in the workplace. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). Women have traditionally been paid less for
doing the same work as men. Cf Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2, 77 Stat.
19851
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men.8 2 The state has an interest in eliminating and preventing the
56 (purpose of the Act to correct working conditions such as depressed wages that affect
women employees' health and efficiency) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)).
Women continue to be paid less than men for comparable work. Cf MINN. STAT.
§ 43A.01, subd. 3 (1982)) (provides comparable pay for comparable work by state employ-
ees).
The income of women was 45% that of men in 1981. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 469 (104th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. Among workers with full-time employment, the mean income
of women was 60.2% that of men. Id In other words, a male with a full-time job earned
on average 66% more than his female counterpart. This income inequality exists without
regard to educational achievement. Over the course of her life, a woman age 35 or older
with five or more years of college can expect to earn less money than a male high school
graduate of the same age. Id. at 470.
Women are restricted from entry into more lucrative careers, including business and
the professions. In 1981, women received only 31.3% of all masters degrees conferred in
business management and administration. Id at 169. They received only 32.8% of all
Doctor of Medicine degrees conferred the same year. Id. at 170. As of 1982, women com-
prised 15.4% of lawyers. Id. at 419.
Women live in the shadow of violence. A large proportion of wives and female part-
ners are battered. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1983). The actual scope of wife bat-
tery is unclear, as no government statistics are maintained on it. Moreover, the criminal
justice system has historically denied recourse and protection to battered women. See Pat-
erson, How the Legal System Responds to Battered Women, in BATTERED WOMEN 79 (D. Moore
ed. 1979); see also Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 587, 393 N.E.2d 976, 978, 419 N.Y.S.2d
901, 903-04 (1979) (suit brought by twelve battered wives to compel police action on com-
plaints dismissed for nonjusticiability). Battering is an underreported crime, as victims
will often cover up the true cause of even serious injuries. D. MARTIN, supra, at 12-13.
Surveys and studies indicate that the problem is severe. Studies indicate that bat-
tering occurs in 16% to 49% of marriages. Straus, A Sociological Perspective on the Causes of
Family Violence, in VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 7 (M. Green ed. 1980); D. RUSSELL, RAPE
IN MARRIAGE 90 (1982); R. GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME 50 (1974); Moore, Editors's
Introduction, in BATTERED WOMEN, supra, at 14. It is estimated that well over one million
wives are beaten each year. D. MARTIN, supra, at 13.
Several hundred thousand women annually are victims of rape. As with battering,
accurate figures on the incidence of rape are difficult to obtain. In 1982, 77,800 forcible
rapes were reported. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 175. Between 50-90% of all rapes
are not reported. J. BODE, FIGHTING BACK 11-12 (1978); E. HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VIC-
TIM 9 (1976). Bode estimates that 500,000 women are raped each year. The Criminal
Justice Resource Center estimated that 191,739 rapes occurred in 1979, with 48% not
reported to police. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1982 244, 293
(1983). Rape figures are also skewed by the fact that some rapes are protected by law. See
Griffin, In 44 States It's Legal to Rape Your Wife, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1980, at 20; Schul-
man, The Marital Rape Exemption in the Criminal Law, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 538 (1980).
In a recent survey, 14% of women who were or had been married disclosed that they were
the victims of rape or attempted rape by their husbands. D. RUSSELL, supra, at 57.
82. See supra notes 75-78. During the course of the public hearings, members of the
therapeutic community who worked with batterers and sex offenders testified as to the
central role of pornography in that violence. See Hearings, supra note 66, Session III, at 44-
45 (testimony of Bill Seals, Director of Sexual Assault Services, Center for Behavior Ther-
apy) (35 of 37 offenders surveyed said they sometimes consumed pornography prior to
committing sexual assaults); Session III, at 50 (testimony of Cheryl Champion, Washing-
ton County Human Services, Inc., Sexual Abuse Project) (all offenders being treated were
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harm caused by pornography. In light of the subordinate status of
women, that state interest is compelling.
V. PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Over the past eighty years, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized various exceptions to the free speech clause of the
first amendment. These exceptions are based on various factors,
but they all exist because these types of communication pose dan-
gers to society which greatly outweigh their worth.
Some communication is regulable because of the context in
which it is made. The words themselves are constitutionally pro-
tected but they lose that protection if they are made in certain
circumstances. Thus, fighting words,83 and speech that presents a
clear and present danger,84 are not protected.
Regulation of communication may turn on its veracity. Thus,
false defamatory statements may be regulated. 85 Statements that
pornography consumers "at a very early age"); Session III, at 63 (testimony of Nancy
Steele) (offenders "generally will increase their consumption of pornography prior to sex
offenses"); Session III, at 67 (testimony of Richelle Lee, State of Minnesota Department of
Corrections) (has yet to work with an offender that did not use pornography); Session III,
at 69 (testimony of Charlotte Kasl, therapist) (pornography is "an integral part of child
abuse").
83. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). The term "fighting
words" appears to indicate that the words themselves are not protected. The denial of
protection, however, depends solely on the context in which the words are used; the words
must be addressed to a particular person, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971)
("fuck the draft" written on jacket held not fighting words), and must "tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace," Chapinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
84. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); accordBrandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiarn).
85. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952). The Supreme Court has
accorded some constitutional protection to false defamatory statements made by the me-
dia. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (states may not impose
liability without fault for publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual). The Court also gives substantial constitutional protection to false de-
famatory statements made about public officials. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (plaintiff must establish that defendant knew statement was false,
or published it with reckless disregard as to its veracity); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155, 170, 172 (1966) (plurality opinion) (applying New York Ttmes standard
to statements made about public figures); Note, Minnesota Defamation Law and the Constitu-
tion, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81 (1977). Neither Gertz nor any other Supreme Court
decision expressly sets forth constitutional limitations on defamation actions brought by
private persons against non-media defendants. Although some language in Gertz suggests
that the New York Tnes "actual malice" standard applies to all defamation defendants,
most courts that have faced the issue have held Gertz inapplicable to non-media defend-
ants. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252,257-58 & n.5 (Minn. 1980) (Gertz
1985]
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infringe upon the common law right to privacy may also be
regulated.
8 6
Some communication can be regulated because the manner in
which it is produced necessarily causes harm. Thus, child pornog-
raphy can be regulated because its production harms the physical
and psychological well-being of the children used in making it.87
The Supreme Court has to date permitted the regulation of only
two types of speech based solely on their content: commercial
speech 88 and obscenity.8 9 Commercial speech receives partial con-
stitutional protection, so that the right of the government to regu-
late it is limited.90 Obscene material, on the other hand, receives
does not apply to non-media defendants in Minnesota; citing decisions of other
jurisdictions).
86. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-90 (1957). In Hi, the plaintiff brought a
statutory action for false light privacy. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS
§ 117, at 812-14 (5th 'ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]; Note, Tortious
Invasion Oftrivacy: Minnesota As A Model, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163 (1978) (evaluates
and compares Prosser's approach to privacy with the socio-psychological concept of pri-
vacy). In Hill, the plaintiff alleged that a news story falsely reported that a play depicted
his real life kidnapping. The Supreme Court overturned a jury award for plaintiff, hold-
ing that under New York Times, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant published the
story with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard as to its veracity. 385 U.S. at 387-
88.
False light privacy is different from, but analogous to, common law defamation. Com-
pare PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 117, at 863-66 (discussing false light in the public eye)
with §§ 111-I 16A (discussing common law defamation). Therefore, not surprisingly, the
Hill Court applied a constitutional limitation on defamation actions to a false light pri-
vacy claim. Hillwas decided at a time when the constitutional limitations on defamation
were rapidly developing. See, e.g., New York Tmes, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (providing constitu-
tional protection to statements about "public officials" absent actual malice); Curtis Tub-
Izhrg Co., 388 U.S. at 155 (extending New York Times protection to "public figures").
Since that time, constitutional limits on defamation actions have been restricted. See Wol-
ston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 165-68 (1979) (restricting definition of "public
figure"). Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (plurality)
(New York Times protection applies to any statement of public concern) with Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 339-48 (New York Times standard does not apply to statements about private persons,
though it relates to a matter of public concern). Consequently, the decision in Hillmay no
longer control in a false light privacy action brought by a private person.
87. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982). Child pornography is not a
content-based classification. Under Ferber, a film or photograph may pretend to portray
sexual activity by minors, so long as minors are not used in making the film or photo-
graph. Ad. at 763.
88. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
89. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
90. SeeCentral Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571
(1980). In Central Hudson Gas, the Court set forth the constitutional limits to regulation of
commercial speech. Commercial speech may be regulated if it promotes unlawful activity
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no protection. 91
or if it is misleading. Id at 566. Even if it comes within first amendment protections, a
state regulation is valid if: (i) "the asserted government interest is substantial" (ii) "the
regulation directly advances the government interest asserted," and (iii) "it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Id.
Constitutional protection for commercial speech has expanded considerably over the
past 40 years. Compare Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 ("the Constitution imposes no . . . re-
straint on government as respects purely commercial advertising") with Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (voiding a state
ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices). Nevertheless, states have more free-
dom to regulate commercial speech than they do to regulate other forms of protected
speech. See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566 (state interest in regulating commercial
speech need not be compelling, but merely substantial); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding state restriction on lawyers' in-person solicitation of cli-
ents); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (striking down munici-
pal ordinance limiting billboard use). The ordinance in Metromedia permitted on-site
commercial advertising, but forbade other commercial advertising and noncommercial
communication not covered by specified exceptions. Id. at 493-96. Seven of the Justices
held that bans on some or all of the outdoor commercial advertising were permissible as a
valid exercise of the police power. Id at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), 568 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The ordinance was struck down because
six Justices felt it impermissibly restricted the use of billboards for noncommercial speech.
Id. at 513-15, 528 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
Commercial speech is also a content-based regulation. The pornography ordinance
goes beyond the limits of the recognized commercial speech exception. Commercial
speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence." Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561. Generally, commercial speech consists of ad-
vertisements for goods and services. The fact that someone has a financial interest in the
communication does not make it commercial speech. The sole purpose of the communica-
tion must be to promote a financial interest in order for the communication to be commer-
cial speech. See id For instance, a paid political advertisement is not commercial speech.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266. Nor are movies or books, though they are produced and
sold for profit or for entertainment. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501-02 (1952) (the fact that books, newspapers and magazines are sold for profit does not
preclude the expression safeguarded by the first amendment).
The proposed ordinance would not affect speech related solely to economic interests
though it can reach certain books and movies. Most economic advertisements are not
sexually explicit as defined in the proposed ordinance and so are outside the scope of the
pornography ordinance. See Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
91. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. This categori-
zation of unprotected communications into content-based and noncontent-based classifi-
cations is a simplified view of the recognized exceptions to the first amendment. For
instance, although obscenity is a content-based exception, it has a contextual component.
Material not otherwise obscene may be regulated if it is displayed to minors, Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), or if its prurient aspects are emphasized, Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 471 (1966) (material was not obscene when distributed in
therapeutic community, but was obscene when the advertiser "animated sensual detail to
give the publication a salacious cast"). Conversely, the fighting words exception can be
regarded as a content-based regulation. One can imagine some words that would not be
likely to induce an immediate breach of the peace under any circumstances. Explanations
in terms of factual content, veracity and context in this section are intended merely to
1985]
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Consideration of the recognized exceptions aids in assessing the
constitutionality of the proposed pornography ordinance. An ex-
amination of the state interests underlying some of the recognized
exceptions indicates how the Court would regard the state interest
underlying the ordinance. The state interest behind each of the
recognized exceptions is in some way analogous to the state inter-
est that is furthered by the MacKinnon/Dworkin pornography
ordinance.
A. Pomography Distinguished From Obscenity
Obscenity is the exception that first comes to mind when consid-
ering the proposed ordinance. Pornographic materials have tradi-
tionally been treated under obscenity law.92 In discussing and
debating the ordinance in Minneapolis, many people have as-
sumed that the ordinance seeks to expand the obscenity definition.
They have viewed it as an improved version of the obscenity laws,
or proclaimed its unconstitutionality because it goes beyond the
constitutional limitations of the obscenity exception.
93
Pornography, as defined in the ordinance, is not obscenity,
though both are content-based regulations. The two concepts dif-
fer in various ways. In Miller v. Califoma, the United States
Supreme Court held that material is obscene if:
(i) applying contemporary community standards, the material
appeals to the prurient interest;
(ii) it depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and,
(iii) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
94
The Miller obscenity definition permits regulation of material
that is patently offensive, .appeals to the prurient interest, and
lacks serious social value.95 While obscenity reaches "patently of-
fensive" material, 96 only material that is "sexually explicit" can
highlight the primary factors affecting the constitutional protection afforded to various
types of communication.
92. See generaloy, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982) (federal obscenity statute); MINN. STAT.
§ 617.241 (1982) (Minnesota obscenity statute); MCO § 385.130 (1976) (Minneapolis ob-
scenity ordinance).
93. For example, a memorandum from the Office of the Minneapolis City Attorney
concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional largely on the ground that it exceeded
the constitutional limitations on the obscenity exception. Letter from David W. Gross,
Assistant City Attorney, to Mayor Donald M. Fraser (March 27, 1984).
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constitute pornography under the proposed ordinance. 97 Material
that is not patently offensive or does not appeal to the prurient
interest may nonetheless constitute pornography under the ordi-
nance. Material that is not pornographic may be obscene, and
vice versa.98
The two concepts address entirely different state interests. They
aim to prevent and remedy different harms. Obscenity regulation
is aimed at preserving the social and moral order.99 Obscenity is
defined in terms of prurience and offensiveness. 100 By considering
97. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
98. The obscenity definition is written in flexible, subjective terms. Its scope depends
on contemporary standards. Virtually any writing or other depiction could be obscene at
different times in different communities. Given this flexibility, it may be overly simplistic
to say that the pornography definition is broader than the obscenity definition. The con-
clusion here that the pornography definition will reach non-obscene materials means only
that certain material is not within the present scope of the obscenity definition.
Some material that would be ruled obscene would not be covered by the definition of
pornography contained in the ordinance. To this extent, the pornography definition is
narrower than the obscenity definition. Under the Mller standard, material that is not
sexually explicit and does not subordinate women may be obscene. For purposes of the
analysis in this section, it is important only that the pornography definition is broader
than the obscenity definition in some respects. See generally in/a notes 191-93 and accom-
panying text (comparison of pornography and obscenity definitions under the vagueness
doctrine).
99. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (regulation of obscenity
furthers the social interest in order and morality); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (social interest in morality and order outweighs any need for constitu-
tional protection of lewd and obscene materials). Despite the large volume of court deci-
sions on obscenity, the Court has failed to pinpoint the state interest involved; nor has it
referred to that state interest as compelling. The Court has stated that obscenity is "ut-
terly without redeeming social importance," Roth, 354 U.S. at 484, and that it does "not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. This
reasoning illustrates that the Court may recognize an exception to the first amendment
absent a compelling state interest. This is a true balancing test: the lower the social value
of the communication, the less important must be the state interest required to allow its
regulation. Thus, political speech can be regulated only if there is a compelling state
interest, while obscenity can be regulated even absent an identified or identifiable compel-
ling state interest.
The ordinance furthers an important state interest by regulating communication that
has little or no social value. The focus of this paper is on the compelling nature of the
state interest in regulating pornography. Regardless of the social value of pornography,
the compelling nature of the state interest is probably sufficient to justify regulation of it.
The Court has noted that at least certain pornographic material possesses only mini-
mal social value. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (obscenity); Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (child pornog-
raphy, whether or not obscene); see also Young, 427 U.S. at 61 ("there is surely a less vital
interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between por-
nography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and polit-
ical significance"). It is the author's view that other forms of pornography possess no more
social value than the forms that have been addressed by the Court in these cases.
100. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (1973).
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offensiveness, the definition classifies material on the basis of taste.
By considering prurient interest, it looks to arousal of the male
audience.' 0 '
The pornography ordinance looks to the harm caused by porno-
graphic material. The definition of pornography includes only
material that subordinates women.' 0 2 The statement of findings
contained in the ordinance asserts that pornography is "a system-
atic practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex."'
10 3
The stated purpose of the ordinance is to prohibit this exploitation
and subordination. 0 4 The ordinance thus seeks to protect a state
interest and regulate a class of communication not reached by ob-
scenity law. '0 5
B. Pornography and Defamation
The harms addressed by the ordinance and defamation law are
similar. The communication regulated by both possesses less in-
trinsic value than communication which is afforded full constitu-
tional protection.
Defamation causes harm to reputation.10 6 This is a form of psy-
chological harm. Defamation law protects a person's right to fend
off personal attacks on his or her good name and allows him or her
to set the record straight by correcting the defamatory imputa-
tions.' 07 Defamation law protects against these harms by regulat-
ing a class of communication that possesses minimal social
value.10 False statements have no place in the free exchange of
ideas: they contribute nothing to any meaningful discussion. 09
False defamatory statements are generally outside the scope of
101. The question whether something appeals to the prurient interest is a question of
constitutional fact, subject to de novo review by an appellate court. See Miller, 413 U.S. at
25; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1961-63 (1984)
(Supreme Court may conduct independent factual review of record to determine whether
speech in question falls within unprotected category).
102. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
103. Id § 1, to add MCO § 139.10(a)(1).
104. Id. § 1, to amend MCO § 139.10(b)(4).
105. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
106. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 86, § 111, at 771.
107. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 631 (1978) ("the de-
famatory statement was not speech for which 'more speech' was an adequate remedy:
experience had shown that the truth rarely catches up with the lie").
108. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), cited with approval in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
109. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
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the first amendment. 0  Defamatory statements made about pub-
lic officials and public figures, however, receive partial constitu-
tional protection."' This protection is deemed necessary to avoid
a chilling effect on truthful statements."
2
The potential for harm characteristic of defamation is also char-
acteristic of pornography. Pornography, like defamation, causes
psychological harm. It taints the self-image of women. It creates
an atmosphere of violence that stifles the full exercise of women's
civil rights." 3 It sexualizes women and women's activities, thus
subjecting them to institutionalized harassment and objecti-
fication. 114
Pornography also lacks serious social value. Like false defama-
tory statements, it adds little or nothing to the marketplace of
ideas." 5 It does not pretend to further our knowledge or apprecia-
tion of the real world. Like false statements, pornography seeks to
create its own reality. Unlike the regulation of defamatory state-
ments, however, the regulation of pornography does not pose a
serious danger of chilling truthful or otherwise valuable
dialogue. 116
Under the common law rule, a plaintiff could recover damages
for defamation upon a showing that the defendant made a false
defamatory statement about him to a third person.' ' 7 For libel
and certain forms of slander one could recover damages without
110. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952). "[S]uch utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that is derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality." Id at 256-57; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979);
Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; supra note 85 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 85.
112. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; New York Tzunes, 376 U.S. at 279.
113. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 80.
115. Justice Holmes wrote "The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market . Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
116. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976). In Young, the
Court stated:
[W]e are not persuaded that the Detroit zoning ordinances will have a significant
deterrent effect on the exhibition of films protected by the First Amendment...
[Tihere is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that
is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the free
dissemination of ideas of social and political significance.
Id at 60-61.
117. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 86, § 113, at 797. Under the common law rule,
truth was an affirmative defense which the defendant was required to plead and prove. Id.
§ 116, at 798.
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any proof of pecuniary loss. 118
Under the current common law rule, a statement must refer to a
particular person in order to be considered defamatory.1 9 It is
therefore unlikely that a court would treat pornographic material
as false defamatory speech. While there is Supreme Court prece-
dent for a cause of action for "group libel," modern developments
in defamation law have rendered the concept constitutionally
suspect. 120
The state interest in regulating pornography is greater than the
interest in regulating defamation. States are permitted to regulate
defamation to remedy and deter the harm that is caused by indi-
vidual defamatory statements. The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordi-
nance addresses a harm that is thematic and more pervasive. The
ordinance seeks to remedy a harm caused by statements that are
all saying the same thing. Pornography is symphonic defamation.
C Pornography and the Clear and Present Danger Doctrine
The Supreme Court has denied constitutional protection to
speech that constitutes a clear and present danger of imminent
lawless action. 121 This doctrine arose in the context of communi-
cation that threatened the national security 22 and created a dan-
ger of imminent harm.' 23 Its application has continued to be
limited to communication that allegedly threatens the national in-
terest. 24 The fighting words exception, which permits regulation
of communication that by its nature creates a threat of imminent
118. Id § 112, at 785-86. Slanderous statements are actionable in most jurisdictions
without proof of actual damages if they impute a crime, a loathsome disease, or sexual
impropriety, or if they affect the plaintiff in his or her occupation or business. Id. § 112, at
788-93.
119. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 86, § 111, at 778. Corporations and other entities
can bring actions for defamation in certain situations. Id § 111, at 779-80.
120. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. 250. The Beauharnats Court upheld a conviction under
an Illinois group libel law of a defendant who distributed racist literature. Id. at 267.
Though Beauhamais has never been directly overruled, the development of defamation law
since that time makes the ruling constitutionally questionable. See generally NOWAK, supra
note 47, at 943-44.
121. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
122. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52-53.
123. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-43 (1978)
("[T]he test requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude
of the danger said to flow from the particular utterances and then to balance the character
of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression").
124. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 251 (1961) (Communist Party in-
struction to Blacks to gain power by overthrowing the United States government).
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violence, 125 is a variant of the clear and present danger doctrine.1 2 6
Both of these exceptions are based on the notion that certain
statements pose a serious and imminent danger of harm, and that
this harm cannot be averted by discussion or education. 12 7 In this
context, the communication has "all the effect of force"' 28 and
loses its character as protected speech. 129 The harm of these regul-
able words is analogous to the harm of pornography. Empirical
data points to the conclusion that pornography contributes to vio-
lence against women. 30 Like fighting words and words that create
a clear and present danger, pornography raises a spectre of vio-
lence not associated with protected speech.
The central concern of the clear and present danger exception is
125. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Chaplinsky Court
wrote "It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Id (footnote omitted).
126. Together, the doctrines apply to two extremes of violence. The clear and present
danger doctrine is directed at national harm, while the fighting words doctrine is directed
at harm to individuals. The author is unaware of any Supreme Court decision where
these or related doctrines have been applied to permit the regulation of communications
that posed an imminent danger to a distinct population group. Nonetheless, there appears
to be no principled reason why the clear and present danger/fighting words rationale
could not be applied to communication that poses an imminent threat of danger to an
identifiable class of people. Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)
(Ku Klux Klan leader's threatening statements about Blacks and Jews constitutionally
protected because statements raised no imminent threat of violence or lawlessness). Por-
nography could conceivably be subject to this rationale because it poses an imminent
threat of danger to women as a class.
127. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
rev'd, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). "[N]o danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discus-
sion." Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Justices Holmes and Brandeis were the architects of the clear and present danger
doctrine. It is their view, and not the majority opinions in Whitney and Abrams, that under-
lies the present dimensions of the doctrine. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937).
128. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
129. In discussing the fighting words doctrine, one set of commentators averred that:
[I]t is the better analysis to regard fighting words as within the ambit of action
rather than speech as there is no intellectual content to be conveyed to the lis-
tener, but merely a provocative, emotional message . . . . The theory of the
regulation of 'fighting words' is not contrary to the theory of the free market-
place of ideas because this speech triggers an automatic reaction, with no think-
ing, rather than a consideration of an idea.
NOWAK, supra note 47, at 954. Consider whether pornography possesses "intellectual con-
tent," or "triggers an automatic reaction."
130. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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to prevent harm, fueled by communication, that could not be
averted by discussion and the free flow of ideas.13' Like speech
that is a clear and present danger, the harms of pornography can-
not be averted by the free flow of ideas. Pornography eroticizes
women and women's actions.1 32 It alters society's attitudes and
behavior toward women.1 33 Though the harm of pornography is
not imminent as required by the clear and present danger test,
1 34
pornography poses a serious and pervasive danger analogous to
that sought to be precluded under the clear and present danger
exception.
D. Pornography and Child Pornography
The pornography ordinance is also analogous to the recently
recognized child pornography exception to the first amendment.
In the 1982 decision of New York v. Ferber,135 the Supreme Court
upheld a New York law prohibiting the distribution of child por-
nography. 136 In Ferber, the Court recognized the harm that may be
suffered by those involved in the production of pornography.
The Court's ruling was based on the rationale that children used
131. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (conviction for threatening to
kill the President overturned where no actual threat of a future harm existed); Whitney,
274 U.S. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
132. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
133. Id
134. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
135. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
136. In Ferber, the defendant, the proprietor of an adult bookstore, was convicted of
promoting "any (sexual] performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a
child less than sixteen years of age." NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 263.00(1) (McKinney
1980) (quoted in Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751). Sexual conduct under the statute was defined as
"actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, mas-
turbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals." NEW YORK PENAL
LAW § 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980) (quoted in Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751). The statute made
no distinction between violent and nonviolent pornography.
The statute at issue in Ferber set the age of majority at 16. On May 21, 1984, Congress
amended a child pornography law similar to the New York law upheld in Ferber, ex-
tending it to performers under the age of 18. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251-54). In light of the wide-
spread treatment of the 18th birthday as the date of majority in a wide variety of contexts,
see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § I (granting 18-year-olds the right to vote), the
amended federal law would most likely be sustained for the reasons stated in Ferber.
Quaere whether the Court would uphold a child pornography law setting the age of ma-
jority at 21. This age is also associated with the acquisition of various rights reserved for
adulthood such as the right to purchase alcoholic beverages. Such a law, if sustained,




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/3
A CIVIL RIGHTS APPROACH TO PORNOGRAPHY
in the production of pornography are hurt by it. 137 The use of
children was found to be injurious to their physical, emotional,
and mental health. 38 The Court stated that child pornography is
"intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.' 39 The pro-
hibition on the sale of child pornography was upheld as necessary
to eliminate the economic incentive for its production. 140
The Ferber case was limited to child pornography. The decision
did not discuss or acknowledge the harm of pornography to adult
participants. The Court did hint that such harm would be of
lesser concern.' 41 It may, therefore, appear easy to dismiss Ferber as
inapplicable to pornography that does not involve the use of mi-
nors. The Court's reasons for carving out a child pornography ex-
ception to the first amendment, however, do apply to permitting
state regulation of all pornography.
The Court found that child pornography is intrinsically related
to the sexual abuse of children in two ways. First, the porno-
graphic material constituted a permanent record of the child's par-
ticipation which could harm the child in future years. 142 This
concern is equally applicable to adult women. Adults, like minors,
may be anguished by the knowledge that people are buying, sell-
ing, and viewing displays of their bodies.
43
Second, the production of pornography "requires the sexual ex-
ploitation of children."'' 44 It is unclear whether the Court saw
child pornography as exploitive because participation in pornogra-
137. The New York statute was the first law ever considered by the Court that sought
to regulate pornographic material on the basis of the psychological and physiological
harm it caused. The Court held that the Miller obscenity standard was inadequate to
address the harm. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
138. Id at 758. It is noteworthy that the Court based its conclusion that pornography
caused this harm on scientific studies. Id. at 758 n.9 (collecting scientific authorities).
139. Id at 759.
140. Id at 761-62.
141. The Court noted that safeguarding the health of children was a matter of special
concern to the state. Id. at 756-57. The Court also noted that if the material being pro-
duced were "necessary" for literary or artistic purposes, a person over the age of minority
could be used. Id at 763.
The recognition of a special state interest in protecting children is consistent with
other decisions of the Court. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(FCC may prohibit broadcast of "seven dirty words" at time of day when minors are likely
to be listening); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state may prohibit sale of
non-obscene material to minors).
142. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 & n.10.
143. Women testified at the Minneapolis hearings to the harm they are suffering. See
Hearings, supra note 66.
144. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
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phy is inherently exploitive, or because nonconsensual involve-
ment in pornography is exploitive. If the former, this reason is
equally applicable to adult women involved in pornography. If
the latter, it is at least applicable to adult women who have been
forced or coerced into the production of pornography.'
45
Aside from the age limitation on the child pornography statute
in Ferber, the definition of pornography contained in the ordinance
is arguably narrower than the definition of illegal activity in Fer-
ber. 146 The ordinance seeks to protect several state interests and is
not limited to the state's concern for minors. 47 Though the many
differences between the proposed pornography ordinance and
child pornography make any precise comparison impossible, Ferber
evidences the Court's willingness to accord great weight to pornog-
raphy's harm to participants.
VI. THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE AND OVERBREADTH AND
VAGUENESS
The previous section discussed the proposed pornography ordi-
nance as a content-based regulation. The regulability of pornog-
raphy is, however, only one of the constitutional hurdles that must
be overcome. An otherwise valid regulation of communication is
void if it reaches beyond its permissible scope or if it is unduly
vague.
A. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine requires that laws regulating unpro-
tected communication not also impinge on areas of protected
speech. 48 A law that goes beyond the boundary separating pro-
tected from unprotected speech violates the doctrine and is uncon-
stitutional. 49 The purpose of the doctrine is to avoid undue self-
145. The Court never discussed the question whether minors involved in pornography
are in it of their own volition. One seeking to limit the applicability of Ferber to minors
could assert that minors, by virtue of their tender years, are incapable of giving meaning-
ful consent to participation in pornography.
146. The Ferber statute prohibited the depiction of various acts and postures, regardless
of whether they subordinated the children involved. Many types of depictions that would
fall within the New York statute in Ferber would not be covered by any of the nine depic-
tions enumerated in the pornography ordinance.
147. See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
148. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 522 (1972).
149. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634-35; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)
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restraint by people in the exercise of their first amendment
rights. 150 To diminish this chilling effect, even one whose actions
are clearly unprotected by the Constitution may challenge the
statute being applied as overbroad. 151 Every statute that regulates
communication is likely to impinge to some degree on protected
speech.1 52 For this reason the law is void only if the overbreadth is
substantial. 153
There are two ways in which the issue of overbreadth may arise.
First, a court may find that the government has a compelling state
interest in regulating some, but not all, of the material covered by
the ordinance. For instance, a court may find that the city of Min-
neapolis has an important interest sufficient to justify regulation of
material that depicts women "as sexual objects who experience
sexual pleasure in being raped,"' 154 but not to justify regulation of
material that depicts women "dehumanized as sexual objects,
things or commodities."'
155
(invalidating a law "which does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of
state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary
circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech").
150. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768 (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634); see also Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the overbroad statute at
issue "hangs over their heads like a sword of Damocles"). The overbreadth doctrine is
limited to first amendment rights. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 380; Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 168 (1972).
151. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
152. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 859 n.61
(1970). The Supreme Court stated that "particularly where conduct and not merely
speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
153. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769; Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) (invalidation is
inappropriate where there are only "marginal applications in which a statute would in-
fringe on first amendment values").
The overbreadth must be particularly substantial where the law regulates expressive
conduct rather than pure expression. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, cited with approval in Ferber,
458 U.S. at 770; see also Parker, 417 U.S. at 760. Consider whether pornography is pure
expression, or whether it lies somewhere further along the speech-conduct continuum.
The rape of a woman is clearly conduct. On the other hand, standing on a soapbox in
downtown Minneapolis and discussing the merits of raping women is pure expression.
Pornography lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Pornographic material is expressive, communicating that women should be treated in
certain ways and that women enjoy being treated in those ways. It also has a conduct
aspect. Real women, some against their will, pose for and act out the view of the world
that pornography espouses. For purposes of overbreadth analysis, the important point is
that pornography is less benign than, and should be distinguished from, pure expression.
154. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(l)(iii).
155. Id § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1)(i). As noted supra at note 8, a modified ver-
sion of the MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance was adopted in Indianapolis. On
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Second, the issue of overbreadth may arise if the actual scope of
the ordinance arguably exceeds its intended purpose. This is likely
to arise, if at all, in the argument that the ordinance might reach
great literature or great works of art. The constitutional issue is
whether the proposed ordinance is substantially overbroad. 156 It is
impossible to answer this question without knowing how the court
would interpret the definition in the ordinance and the state inter-
est involved. 157 A probable result may be suggested, however, by
the Court's decision in New York v. Ferber. 
158
After recognizing child pornography as a new exception to the
first amendment, 59 the Ferber Court considered an overbreadth
challenge to the New York child pornography statute. 60 The
lower court held that the statute was overbroad because it would
prohibit the sale of medical and educational materials containing
photographs of minors performing the specified sexual acts.
161
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the statute would reach
"some protected expression, ranging from medical textbooks to
pictorials in the National Geographic .. ".. ,,16 These instances,
however, would amount to only "a tiny fraction of the materials
within the statute's reach."' 63 According to the Court, the stat-
ute's "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applica-
tions."'1 64  Those impermissible applications could be "cured
through case-by-case analysis,"' 65 and did not render the statute
impermissibly overbroad.166 Following this reasoning, it is likely,
May 1, the American Booksellers Association and nine other named plaintiffs filed suit in
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional. See
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, No. IP 84-
791C (S.D. Ind. 1984) (on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office). There was no
claim that the ordinance was only unconstitutional in part. The Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union has taken the same position with regard to the Minneapolis ordinance. See Ojala,
The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance-Censorshtp Not Civil Rights, HENNEPIN LAW., Mar.-
Apr. 1984, at 10.
156. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
157. SeeJenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974) (patently offensive element of
the obscenity definition construed not to reach depictions contained in the film Carnal
Knowledge). The proposed ordinance may require lawyers and laypersons alike to reassess
the criteria by which something is labeled "literature" or "art."
158. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
159. Id at 765. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
160. Id at 766.
161. Id
162. Id. at 773.
163. Id
164. Id
165. Id at 774.
166. Id at 773.
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though not certain, that the ordinance would withstand such a
challenge and be held not substantially overbroad.
B. The Vagueness Doctrine
The vagueness doctrine imposes a requirement of specificity on
legislation. Due process requires that a law provide persons with
fair notice of what they may and may not do. 167 The terms of the
law must convey "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and prac-
tices.' 1 68 A statute that is worded so that persons "of common in-
telligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application" is void for vagueness. 169 Like the overbreadth doc-
trine, the vagueness doctrine is intended to avert self-censorship. 70
Statutes must be sufficiently specific to assure that people are not
required to forego exercise of a constitutional right to ensure
avoidance of the statute's sanctions.' 7' The language of the statute
must permit a person of ordinary common sense to understand it
and comply with it.172 An otherwise vague statute will be valid,
167. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). A law must "give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the stat-
ute." Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)); accord
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (voiding criminal statute prohibiting
"gang" membership because "all are entitled to be informed as to what the State com-
mands or forbids"); see also Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
The vagueness doctrine is a requirement grounded in the due process clause of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951); Connally v. General Construction
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390 (1926).
168. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957), quoting United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453.
169. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391; cf Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.9 (1973) (a
defendant's constitutional rights are not abridged though jurors may reach different re-
sults in applying a law to the facts).
170. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (vague language
requires one "to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbid-
den areas were clearly marked") (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
171. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,
287 (1961).
172. Unlike the overbreadth doctrine, the vagueness doctrine also applies beyond the
first amendment area. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29,
36-37 (1963) (statute prohibiting certain unfair business practices upheld against vague-
ness challenge); Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297, 303 (1938) (statute providing for reha-
bilitation of insolvent insurance companies upheld against vagueness challenge). The
constitutional standard for specificity is not stated any differently for first amendment
cases than for other cases. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-28, at
719 (1978). As a practical matter, however, the Court will require greater precision in
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however, if judicial interpretation of its terms makes it more spe-
cific. 173 The Supreme Court will look beyond the four corners of
the statute when assessing its clarity and will also consider judicial
decisions interpreting it. 174
If the proposed ordinance is enacted, it is almost certain that its
definition of pornography1 75 will be subjected to a vagueness chal-
lenge.1 76 Each of the four elements of the definition would be scru-
tinized for vagueness. In the first element of pornography, for
instance, the operative word is "graphically."' 177 The scope of the
graphically depicted element is limited by the ordinary usage of its
terms. A graphic depiction is "vividly descriptive, life-like' 78 or
"marked by clear and lively description or striking imaginative
power." 179 A writing is graphic when it "produc[es] . . . by words
the effect of a picture."' 180 Using a definitional approach, there-
fore, the first element limits the scope of the ordinance to detailed
depictions.
The second element, that the material be sexually explicit,'""
requires sexual content in the material. The sexually explicit ele-
ment contains an element of ambiguity. On the one hand, it could
mean the explicit display of sexual body parts: the crotch, but-
tocks and breasts. The Minneapolis Task Force on Pornography
laws arguably touching upon first amendment guarantees. Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982); Hynes v. Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,
620 (1976) ("The general test of vagueness applies with particular force in review of laws
dealing with speech"). Compare Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337
(1952) (statute requiring motor carriers to avoid congested routes upheld against vague-
ness challenge) with Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (prohibition on treating
American flag contemptuously held void for vagueness).
173. Hoffnan Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.5. This rule of law is illustrated in Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), in which the Court upheld a federal obscenity statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982), that prohibits the use of the mails to convey any "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article," by reading the Miller requirements into the
statute. 418 U.S. at 116.
174. See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 774 (1977) (vague obscenity law saved by
state judicial construction).
175. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg).
176. In the pending case in Indianapolis of American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, dis-
cussed supra note 155, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the civil rights ordinance was
vague and overbroad. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 1, American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, No. IP 84-791C (S.D. Ind. 1984) (on file at the William Mitchell Law
Review office).
177. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
178. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 359 (1933).
179. WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 990 (1976).
180. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 359 (1933).
181. Proposed Amendment § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
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defined this element in those terms.'8 2 On the other hand, it could
encompass explicit depictions of sexual activity. 8 3 It would be
helpful, for constitutional purposes, if a legislative body adopting
this or a similar ordinance would define the term one way or the
other. The absence of a statutory definition, however, will not
render a term unconstitutionally vague. As noted above, applica-
tion of the vagueness doctrine requires consideration of judicial in-
terpretations of the otherwise vague terms.
8 4
The third element of pornography, "subordination of wo-
men," 1 5 may be the most problematic. Much of the difficulty
with the term stems from the novelty of its use in the law, at least
in the first amendment context. The subordination element incor-
porates the harm of pornography into the definition of pornogra-
phy. 1 6 The harm of pornography is that it contributes to the
inferior status of women. The Minneapolis Task Force on Pornog-
raphy captured the essence of this harm when it defined subordi-
nation as "the treatment of another as inferior, submissive to, or
controlled by another; made subject or subservient to another."'8 7
For example, a depiction of a woman that signified her uncondi-
tional sexual availability to the viewer, or the exhibition of her as a
sexual slave for all who desired her, would constitute
subordination.
Even if the Task Force definition were written into the proposed
ordinance, a court might still hold the term unduly vague. Under-
standing the term requires an understanding of the harm which
the term addresses. 88 The validity of the ordinance in the face of
a vagueness challenge will thus depend to some degree on the
court's understanding of the harm that pornography causes.
The final element of the pornography definition consists of nine
182. See supra note 28.
183. Id.
184. Adoption by a court of one interpretation or the other would likely provide the
term with the required specificity. Even absent a judicial interpretation, the term may be
sufficiently specific. For instance, the "body parts" meaning is subsumed within the
broader "sexual activity" meaning. As such, any judicial consideration of the term would
be not so much a matter of interpretation as of limitation. The broader definition itself is
probably sufficiently objective and clear to survive scrutiny. For a further discussion of
the sexually explicit element, see infra note 193 and accompanying text.
185. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
186. As noted supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text, pornography is the subordina-
tion of women through sexuality.
187. See supra note 28.
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particular types of depictions, one of which must be met in order
for the material to be classified as pornography. As the nine provi-
sions are independent and written in the disjunctive, a court may
void one or more of them without voiding the entire definition.18 9
An assessment of the likely outcome of a vagueness challenge
can best be made by considering the degree of specificity the court
requires in other first amendment contexts. The closest analogy
for this purpose is the court's definition of obscenity. 90
Constitutional protection for material challenged as obscene
turns on notions of prurient interest, patent offensiveness, and seri-
ous value. 191 These are elusive measures. Moreover, by injecting
the notion of contemporary community standards into the defini-
tion, the degree of constitutional protection is made dependent on
the time and place of the communication. 9 2
The serious social value element of the obscenity definition is
the only element that focuses on the material, rather than on the
viewer's response to it. Thus, despite the relative nature of the
term "serious," it is the least vague element in the definition.
The sexually explicit element of the pornography definition is
analogous to the prurient interest element of obscenity, in that
both focus on the sexual tenor of the material. The similarity ends
there, however. The prurient interest element looks to the arousal
of the viewer, typically male. As prurient interest is a question of
constitutional fact subject to independent review by an appellate
court, 193 this requirement will be satisfied only if the material is
capable of arousing both the jury and the reviewing judge.
The sexually explicit element does not incorporate an effect-ori-
ented, subjective approach. The focus is on the depiction, not how
people will react to it. This focus provides a more objective crite-
189. The proposed ordinance contains a severability clause, which provides that
"should any part(s) of this ordinance be found legally invalid, the remaining part(s) re-
main valid." Proposed Amendment § 4, to add MCO § 139 .4 0(q).
190. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (definition of obscenity).
191. Id
192. A state may define the community as it sees fit. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,
157 (1974); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 617.241, subd. I(c) (Supp. 1983) (defining community
as "the political subdivision from which persons properly qualified to serve as jurors in a
civil proceeding are chosen"). As the community standards to be applied are contempo-
rary ones, the determination of whether a certain piece of material is obscene may change
with time. See also Allen, Community standard sought for enforcing obscenity ordinance, Minneapo-
lis Star & Trib., Aug. 3, 1984, at IB, col. 1.
193. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25; accord Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1963 (1984).
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rion for the trier of fact. It also makes it easier for would-be produ-
cers, distributors, and sellers of pornography to adjust their con-
duct to avoid liability under the ordinance.
The subordination element of pornography is analogous to the
patently offensive element of obscenity, as both incorporate the
state interest into the respective definitions. Like the prurient in-
terest element, the patently offensive element looks to the viewer's
reaction to the material, not to the material itself. Offensiveness,
like prurient appeal, is an inherently subjective judgment depend-
ing on the viewer's visceral reaction to the matter, not on a rea-
soned assessment of the material. The subordination requirement
of pornography is an objective criterion. It requires examination
of the woman in relation to others in the depiction or to the rea-
sonable viewer. The question of subordination can thus be reason-
ably answered at the time the material is first produced or
distributed. The terms of the pornography definition thus provide
clearer notice than the terms of the obscenity definition that cer-
tain materials do or do not come within the terms of the law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The MacKinnon/Dworkin proposed ordinance presents a crea-
tive, thoughtful, and novel approach to the regulation of pornog-
raphy. It is the first law that has defined pornographic material in
terms of the many harms that it causes. As a regulation of com-
munication that has presumptively been accorded constitutional
protection, the proposed ordinance will present the courts with
several challenging first amendment issues.
Since the proposed ordinance is a unique approach to pornogra-
phy, the outcome of a constitutional challenge is difficult to pre-
dict. Nevertheless, Supreme Court decisions in other areas of first
amendment jurisprudence provide guidance in answering this
question. The constitutionality of a regulation of communication
hinges on the substantiality of the state interest being protected.
The ordinance addresses several harms of pornography. These
harms are a part of women's everyday lives and our social fabric.
The existence and extent of these harms are confirmed by a grow-
ing body of empirical data.
The precise state interests involved here have never been
squarely presented to the Court. The Court has, however, adjudi-
cated cases involving similar or analogous harms. It has ruled that
the harms to be averted by defamation law, the clear and present
1985]
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danger doctrine, and child pornography statutes are sufficient to
permit regulation of those classes of communication. The harms
of pornography are equal to or greater than the harms addressed
by these three types of communication. The MacKin-
non/Dworkin proposed ordinance is to date the most effective and
comprehensive approach to combatting the harm of pornography.
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